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The New(Clear?) Electricity Federalism: 
Federal Preemption of States’ “Zero 
Emissions Credit” Programs 
Joel B. Eisen* 
Two pending federal appellate cases involving Illinois and New York laws, 
Old Mill Creek v. Star and Coalition For Competitive Electricity v. Zibelman 
respectively,1 involve the conflict between federal authority over the electric grid 
and state laws supporting nuclear power plants. The issues are nearly identical in 
both cases.2 In Illinois, New York, and other states,3 aging nuclear plants are 
struggling to stay in business. These plants generate electricity and sell it in 
 
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. The author thanks Ari Peskoe, Emily 
Hammond, Dick Pierce, and Shelley Welton for their insights, as well as the participants in the Harvard 
Environmental Law Program’s October 2017 workshop on “Regulatory Paths Forward for a Cleaner 
Grid,” and the panelists and attendees at the Vermont Law School’s October 2017 symposium on “The 
Energy Transition,” at which the author presented on this topic. 
 1.  Village of Old Mill Creek v. Star, 2017 WL 3008289 (N.D. Ill.), appeal docketed, No. 17-2445 
(7th Cir. July 18, 2017); Coal. For Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d 554 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal 
docketed, No. 17-2654 (2d Cir. Aug. 25, 2017). 
 2.  Besides preemption issues, the cases raise Dormant Commerce Clause challenges, which are 
addressed separately in Sam Kalen & Steven Weissman, The Electric Grid Confronts the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 44 ECOLOGY L.Q. CURRENTS (2018); see generally Felix Mormann, Constitutional 
Challenges and Opportunities for State Climate Policy Innovation, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189 (2017) 
(discussing Constitutional challenges to state clean energy policies). 
The District Court decisions also hold that the Supremacy Clause bars private causes of action for 
preemption under Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015) and the courts’ 
reading of the FPA, which creates no rights for individual citizens to assert preemption claims. See Jim 
Rossi, The Brave New Path Of Energy Federalism, 95 TEX. L. REV. 399, 462 (2016) (discussing this issue 
and finding that its resolution is “not at all clear”). This Article proceeds under the assumption that the 
preemption issues require resolution regardless of the disposition of the Armstrong issue. 
 3.  See Peter Maloney, Feud of the Year: Nuclear and coal vs. competitive markets, UTILITY DIVE 
(Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/feud-of-the-year-nuclear-and-coal-vs-competitive-
markets/508266/ (describing support efforts underway in Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Ohio in addition 
to those in New York and Illinois). Connecticut’s General Assembly recently passed a bill that on its face 
would establish a system of zero-carbon procurement for the state, but which in reality would support the 
state’s only nuclear power plant. Mark Pazniokas, Millstone bill passes House, goes to governor, THE CT. 
MIRROR (Oct. 26, 2017), https://ctmirror.org/2017/10/26/millstone-bill-passes-house-goes-to-governor/ 
(discussing SB-1501, Conn. Gen. Assembly, Sess. Year 2017). The CEO of New Jersey’s utility, PSEG, 
recently claimed its nuclear plants would not survive without subsidies. Peter Maloney, PSEG CEO: 
Salem, Hope Creek nukes will close absent subsidies, UTILITY DIVE (Dec. 6, 2017), 
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/pseg-ceo-salem-hope-creek-nukes-will-close-absent-
subsidies/512345/. 
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regional wholesale electricity markets that grid operators known as “independent 
system operators” (ISOs) and “regional transmission organizations” (RTOs) 
administer.4 Competition in these markets, primarily with low-priced natural gas 
but also with renewables, has lowered prices and left the nuclear plants short of 
recovering their high operating and capital costs.5 
Concerned about this, the states are subsidizing these plants. The plaintiff-
appellants in Star and Zibelman argue that the authority of the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) over the wholesale electricity markets under 
the Federal Power Act (FPA) preempts these state subsidies.6 This Article 
proposes and explains a test for resolving the upcoming appeals that turns on the 
state’s conscious disregard of FERC’s authority. If a state law explicitly and 
consciously aims to directly affect wholesale market prices, terms, or conditions, 
its subsidy program is impermissible as an intrusion on FERC’s regulatory turf. 
It further contends that only this test can harmonize three recent Supreme Court 
decisions on the intersection of state and federal jurisdiction over the electric 
grid, preserve valuable state policy experimentation, and set a narrowly defined 
preemption standard that avoids unintended consequences in future litigation. 
Applying the test to the state nuclear subsidies, this Article concludes that federal 
law preempts them and that the District Courts’ decisions to the contrary were in 
error. 
The subsidy programs are similar in both states. New York and Illinois 
require utilities and other companies that deliver electricity to customers to 
purchase “zero emissions credits” (ZECs) from the affected plants, giving them 
an additional revenue stream.7 “Zero emissions” recognizes that these plants are 
a large source of carbon-free electricity generation.8 In both states, nuclear power 
makes up a significant percentage of both total and clean electricity generation,9 
 
 4.  Today, seven regional grid operators (ISOs and RTOs) operate wholesale markets and serve 
almost two-thirds of the nation. Joel B. Eisen & Felix Mormann, Free Trade In Electric Power, 2018 
UTAH L. REV. 49 (2018); Joel B. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, 49 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1783, 1792–93 (2016) [hereinafter Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform 
the Electric Grid]; Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO), 
FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N (last updated Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-
act/rto.asp. For convenience, this Article will refer to the grid operators as “RTOs.” For a discussion of 
these markets and their operations, see Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in 
the Marketplace, 69 VAND. L. REV. 141 (2016).  
 5.  Joel B. Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, But How Dead, and What Replaces It?, 8 
GEO. WASH. J. OF ENERGY AND ENVT’L L. 3, 17 (Winter 2017) [hereinafter Eisen, Dual Electricity 
Federalism Is Dead]; Emily Hammond, The Energy In-Betweens 14–15 (forthcoming 2018) (on file with 
author). 
 6.  Village of Old Mill Creek, 2017 WL 3008289, at *5; Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d at 563. 
 7.  New York accomplished this through an administrative order of the state’s Public Service 
Commission. See N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, ORDER ADOPTING A CLEAN ENERGY STANDARD, Cases 15-
E-0302 & 16-E-0270 (Aug. 2016). The Illinois program was embodied in the Future Energy Jobs Act, 20 
ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5). 
 8.  Nuclear Power and the Environment, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=nuclear_environment. 
 9.  In 2014, for example, the three New York plants eligible for ZECs supplied 16% of electricity 
generated and delivered in the state. N.Y. DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., STAFF WHITE PAPER ON CLEAN ENERGY 
STANDARD 29 (2016); cf. Hammond, supra note Error! Reference source not found., at 14 (“In New 
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and as a result, the states believe that nuclear plants are an important “bridge” to 
a clean energy future.10 
At first, New York and Illinois attempted to fix the value of ZECs at the 
difference between the affected plants’ costs and revenues.11 New York then 
recognized that the Supreme Court’s Hughes decision effectively foreclosed that 
approach, for reasons discussed below;12 and the Illinois legislative proposal 
aiming to make up revenue gaps failed to become law.13 So both states revised 
their pricing formulas to set the ZEC price initially at the “social cost of carbon” 
(SCC), a measure of the amount of damage a ton of carbon dioxide emissions 
causes.14 New York, which belongs to the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI), subtracts RGGI revenues in the first two-year period.15 Under both new 
formulas, “the math itself includes the wholesale markets.”16 Prices may be 
adjusted under formulas tied to indices of wholesale electricity prices, although 
the two states do this slightly differently. New York’s ZEC price adjusts after the 
first two years by accounting for projected wholesale energy and capacity market 
revenues.17 Illinois uses a “price adjustment” derived from two different indices 
that account for prices in the PJM and MISO energy and capacity wholesale 
markets.18 
 
York, nuclear power represents 59% of non-emitting generation; in Illinois, nuclear power provides over 
90% of non-emitting generation”). 
 10.  Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, supra note 5, at 19; Hammond, supra note 5Error! 
Reference source not found., at 14.   
 11.  Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, supra note 5, at 20. 
 12.  Id. (noting that the original New York formula “could not have survived scrutiny under 
Hughes”).  
 13.  In 2015, the state’s utility commission issued a report that nuclear plants’ falling revenues 
justified action. ILL. COMM. COMM’N ET AL., POTENTIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CLOSINGS IN ILLINOIS 
33–34 (Jan. 5, 2015). Then, Exelon (the power plants’ owner) and the utility, Commonwealth Edison, 
promoted a “Next Generation Energy Plan” (NGEP) that was introduced in the Illinois Legislature. The 
NGEP bill included a “Zero Emission Standard,” that, like the original design of the New York program, 
would have covered the nuclear plants’ revenue shortfalls. 
 14.  ORDER ADOPTING A CLEAN ENERGY STANDARD, supra note 7, at 50–51; Future Energy Jobs 
Act, 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(B). See INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOCIAL COST OF GREENHOUSE 
GASES, TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 
UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,866 (May 2013, revised July 2015)(establishing the SCC); Hearing on S. 
1857, S. 203, S. 839, and S. 1934 Before the S. Comm. on Envt. and Pub. Wks., Subcomm. On Clean Air 
and Nuclear Safety, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Emily Hammond, Glen Earl Weston Research 
Professor of Law, The George Washington Univ. Law School at 5) (noting that, “The SCC was developed 
by an interagency working group, subjected to peer review, and upheld in federal court.”). 
 15.  ORDER ADOPTING A CLEAN ENERGY STANDARD, supra note 7, at 51; see Auction Prices, 
REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, https://www.rggi.org/market/co2_auctions/results (last visited 
Dec. 5, 2017). 
 16.  Hammond, supra note 5, at 15.   
 17.  ORDER ADOPTING A CLEAN ENERGY STANDARD, supra note 7, at 51. 
 18.  Future Energy Jobs Act, 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(B)(i)-(iii). See Brief of Independent Market 
Monitor for PJM as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants at 4, Electric Power Supply 
Association, et al. v. Star, No. 17-2445 (7th Cir. Sept. 5, 2017) (noting that, “[t]he amount of the subsidy 
is tied directly to market prices, termed the ‘baseline market price index’ which equals $31.40 per MWh. 
The baseline market price index is equal to the PJM energy price in Illinois plus the average of the MISO 
and PJM locational capacity market prices.”); Shelley Welton, Electricity Markets and the Social Project 
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The states cleverly designed ZECs to resemble existing state clean energy 
programs, even mimicking “credit” terminology. For this reason, ZECs are easily 
confused with renewable energy credits (RECs), but the two are quite different, 
as discussed below in Part III. Regardless of the environmental justifications, the 
ultimate purpose of ZECs is unmistakable: to keep affected plants from failing 
by making up their revenue shortfalls.19 Unlike REC programs, ZECs explicitly 
aim to cure perceived market shortcomings by giving plants more 
compensation.20 This “self-conscious purpose of preserving baseload generation 
that is struggling on the markets”21 distinguishes ZECs from other state green 
energy programs, which do not take market prices into account, and makes them 
perhaps the “most controversial” state energy programs.22 
And ZECs are just the start. States are increasingly contemplating “around-
market” policies that subsidize specific power plants and “interfere with, or 
operate in spite of, the wholesale markets.”23 States justify these policies with 
concerns about jobs and grid reliability, in addition to emissions.24 These 
initiatives can influence wholesale market outcomes because “any state policy 
that adds or subtracts from a generator’s costs can affect the outcomes in the 
regional market.”25 
There is considerable unease about this interaction between state policies 
and the markets. Many have called into question how – or even whether – the 
 
of Decarbonization, 118 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (on file with author) (describing the 
payment structure). 
 19.  Brief of Independent Market Monitor for PJM, supra note 18, at 2 (“Regardless of the specific 
rationales offered for the subsidies, the proposed solution for the selected generating units is to provide 
out of market subsidies in order to keep uneconomic units in the market.”); Eisen, Dual Electricity 
Federalism Is Dead, supra note 5, at 20; (“it is precisely [the plants’] alleged failure to cover their costs 
in the wholesale markets that has prompted the call for subsidies.”). 
 20.  Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, supra note 5, at 20; Hammond, supra note 5, at 18.   
The development of the Illinois ZEC program illustrates this vividly. When the NGEP legislation failed, 
Exelon announced that its power plants would be closed. RAYMOND L. GIFFORD & MATTHEW S. LARSON, 
STATE ACTIONS IN ORGANIZED MARKETS: STATES STRIVE TO “FIX” MARKETS AND RETAIN BASE LOAD 
GENERATION 3 (2016). Subsequently, stakeholders in Illinois developed the Future Energy Jobs Act, with 
a myriad of provisions, including the new ZEC design. 
In New York, the state had also made it clear that nuclear plants’ financial struggles on wholesale markets 
warranted action. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, ORDER FURTHER EXPANDING SCOPE OF 
PROCEEDING AND SEEKING COMMENTS, Case 15-E-0302, at 4 (Feb. 24, 2016) (clean energy standard 
proceedings expanded for this reason). 
 21.  Hammond, supra note 5, at 12.  
 22.  Welton, supra note 18, at 18. 
 23.  Hammond, supra note 5, at 12; see also GIFFORD & LARSON, supra note 20, at 2 (referring to 
state initiatives as “around market” proposals); PJM Interconnection, Context for PJM Market Design 
Proposals Responding to State Public Policy Initiatives 2 (June 12, 2017) 
https://www.pjm.com/~/media/library/reports-notices/special-reports/20170612-context-for-pjm-market-
design-proposals-responding-to-state-public-policy-initiatives.ashx (noting that this new variety of state 
policies differs from other initiatives of recent years because it “has involved explicit, legislatively-driven 
subsidies for specific generating units.”). 
 24.  SARAH K. ADAIR & FRANZ T. LITZ, UNDERSTANDING THE INTERACTION BETWEEN REGIONAL 
ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND STATE POLICIES 2 (Nov. 2017). 
 25.  Id. at 7.  
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two can coexist going forward.26 And FERC recently convened a technical 
conference to brainstorm solutions, with no clear outcome.27 As a result, Star 
and Zibelman are not simply about whether Illinois and New York can support a 
handful of failing nuclear power plants. They are some of the first encounters in 
what will shape up to be a lengthy dialogue over the boundaries between state 
energy programs and the federally regulated wholesale markets. They will not 
be the last, as challenges to the former will be more frequent.28 
We do not operate on a blank slate, as the Supreme Court has issued three 
decisions in the past two years that define the dividing line between state and 
federal electricity jurisdiction.29 As several commentators have noted,30 this 
makes conflict preemption the most appropriate lens through which to resolve 
these cases. This is implied preemption that occurs either when it is impossible 
for someone to comply with both state and federal laws, or when state law 
thwarts the purposes and objectives of federal law.31 Rather than simply apply 
general preemption principles, this Article conforms its analysis to the Supreme 
Court decisions with a test that harmonizes all three.32 It calls for precluding the 
 
 26.  See, e.g., Welton, supra note 19, at 1 (noting that, “variegated state policies present a challenge 
to the smooth functioning of U.S. electricity markets”); ADAIR & LITZ, supra note 24, at 7; Miles Farmer, 
State Policies and Electricity Markets: Harmony or Conflict?, NRDC BLOG (May 8, 2017), 
https://www.nrdc.org/experts/miles-farmer/state-policies-and-electricity-markets-harmony-or-conflict. 
Former FERC Commissioner Tony Clark recently stated that,  
From Illinois and New York, where nuclear generators stand to receive millions of dollars in state 
sponsored subsidies, to states in New England and the Mid-Atlantic, where massive out of market 
contracts and payments threaten the underpinnings of price formation in both the energy and capacity 
markets, there is a very real concern and possibility that certain wholesale electricity markets will become 
so dysfunctional as to undermine the just and reasonable standard that FERC is duty-bound to uphold. 
TONY CLARK, REGULATION AND MARKETS: IDEAS FOR SOLVING THE IDENTITY CRISIS 6 (2017). 
 27.  FERC held the two-day technical conference on May 1-2, 2017. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 
State Policies and Wholesale Markets Operated by ISO New England Inc., New York Independent System 
Operator, Inc., and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket No. AD17-11-000; see Gavin Bade, Anxiety 
common, consensus elusive over power market reforms at first day of FERC conference, UTILITY DIVE 
(May 2, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/anxiety-common-consensus-elusive-over-power-
market-reforms-at-first-day-of/441753/ (summarizing the discussion).  
The difficulty of harmonizing state policies and the markets is shown in FERC’s action following the 
technical conference, in which it invited comments on five different potential policy paths going forward. 
Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, Notice Inviting Post-Technical Conference Comments (May 23, 2017), 
https://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20170523170542-AD17-11-000PostTC.pdf 
 28.  Hammond, supra note 5, at 12 (noting that these policies “invite scrutiny”); Welton, supra note 
19, at 45 (noting that, “There is now a profusion of litigation challenging state clean energy policies under 
Hughes’ logic.”). 
 29.  Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016); FERC v. Elec. Pwr. Supply Ass’n, 136 
S. Ct. 760 (2016); ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015). 
 30.  See generally Rossi, supra note 2; Brief of Electricity Regulation Scholars as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Defendants-Appellees, Electric Power Supply Association, et al. v. Star, No. 17-2445 (7th Cir. 
Nov. 3, 2017).   
 31.  ONEOK, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1595.  
 32.  Welton, supra note 19, at 45 (noting that the three must be integrated). The process of 
harmonizing all three decisions is essential, given their short timeframe and interlocking references. 
Hughes, for example, reiterates the ONEOK emphasis on “the importance of considering the target at 
which the state law aims in determining whether that law is pre-empted.” [emphasis in original]. Hughes, 
136 S. Ct. at 1298 (quoting ONEOK, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 1599).  
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states from taking actions that intrude the most on FERC’s authority—in one 
commentator’s words, those actions that “aim[] directly at ‘fixing’” a perceived 
shortcoming of the wholesale markets.33 The Article demonstrates that this is 
precisely what ZEC programs do. 
The states made no secret that they believed ZECs were necessary because 
the plants are uneconomic in the wholesale markets. From the start, they 
proposed to make up the difference between costs and market revenues. The 
revised formulas for calculating ZECs that incorporate indices, estimates, and 
forecasts of market prices are just a less obvious way of achieving the same goal. 
Because this consciously disregards wholesale market results,34 this Article 
argues that federal law preempts the ZEC laws and other around-market policies 
that attempt to achieve similar results. 
Part I of this Article discusses the three recent Supreme Court decisions 
involving electricity law. In Part II, and continuing into Part III, the Article 
discusses the test proposed above, and argues that it can meet three different 
goals. First, it harmonizes the Supreme Court decisions, which express solicitude 
for both the wholesale markets and state policies, but aim to protect the markets 
from interference. Second, it is limited in its scope of preemption, reflecting a 
reluctance to establish new bright lines that is especially critical in the new era 
of concurrent jurisdiction, under which the states and FERC act simultaneously 
and each can influence the other. Finally, Part III addresses ZEC defenders’ 
background concern that if this credit program is disallowed, the states will be 
unable to promote and value carbon-free generation. Under the test articulated 
here, the states retain considerable latitude to promote clean energy, as long as 
they do not directly reference the wholesale market in their design. Indeed, under 
the test proposed in this Article, RECs continue to be permissible and ZECs 
would be, too, if they did not reference the markets. 
I.  JUDGING ZECS AGAINST A BACKDROP OF CONCURRENT JURISDICTION 
AND POLICY INNOVATION 
The three recent Supreme Court decisions in electricity law signal a new era 
of electricity jurisprudence. Far from confirming the status quo, the Court 
announced that the split between state and federal jurisdiction over the electric 
grid is no longer clear.35 All three decisions recognize that the states and FERC 
have significant responsibilities in the electric grid, but the Court has scrapped 
the jurisdictional bright line. This new electricity federalism is best described as 
“concurrent.”36 In this new interdependent system, state and federal actors may 
take actions simultaneously and have impacts on the other. We have decades to 
 
 33.  Hammond, supra note 5, at 12. 
 34.  Brief of Independent Market Monitor for PJM, supra note 18, at 9 (noting that, “Illinois is 
setting what it considers the just and reasonable price for wholesale power for these units. That is a FERC 
decision.”). See infra Part II.  
 35.  See Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, supra note 5; Rossi, supra note 2 at 405–07.   
 36.  Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, supra note 5, at 20. 
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work out such matters as overhauling the portfolio of power plants to reduce 
carbon emissions, and it will take considerable experimentation through an 
iterative process involving both sovereigns.37 This dynamic environment of 
policy innovation in the electric grid is an essential backdrop to decision making 
in the ZEC cases. 
FERC v. EPSA, the Court’s 2016 opinion on demand response, describes 
this brilliantly.38 The Court recognized that it is often impossible to characterize 
an activity as purely “retail” (subject to state regulation) or “wholesale” (subject 
to FERC authority).39 It stated that “wholesale and retail markets in electricity, 
as in every other known product, are not hermetically sealed from each other.”40 
As the Court had previously stated in ONEOK v. Learjet, states may regulate 
some matters affecting both retail and wholesale markets, but FERC may as 
well.41 The Court has chosen to address conflicts as they arise, rather than set a 
new bright line. 
The conflicts stem from the FPA’s language that purports to assign 
exclusive jurisdiction to the states and FERC. When power plants bid in 
wholesale markets, they are subject to FERC’s authority to approve market 
structures designed to ensure “just and reasonable” wholesale rates.42 FERC 
approves RTOs’ tariffs that set terms and conditions for wholesale energy 
markets and capacity markets, which provide added compensation for plants that 
commit to be available for years at a time. These markets are recognized for the 
significant benefits they bring to the electricity grid.43 The FPA also makes 
“facilities used for the generation of electric energy,” or, simply, “generation,” 
subject to exclusive state authority.44 States retain jurisdiction over such matters 
as determination of need for, and siting of power plants. And if a state can decide 
whether a plant is needed or where it goes, it can use a credit program to support 
it.45 
State around-market policies therefore involve overlaps between state and 
federal laws, against this backdrop of concurrent policy innovation. ZECs 
resemble credits for new or existing plants that fall within state authority, but 
also impact the federally-regulated wholesale markets. As the remainder of this 
Part demonstrates, the Court has been clear about how conflicts of this sort 
 
 37.  Welton, supra note 18, at 9 (observing that, “the question of how to manage the intersection of 
state policies and regional electricity markets is likely to be a dynamic and region-specific one”). 
 38.  For a full description of the decision and its importance, see Joel B. Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and 
the Path to a Cleaner Electricity Sector, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. F. 1 (2016) [hereinafter Eisen, FERC 
v. EPSA]. 
 39.  FERC v. Elec. Pwr. Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 775–76 (2016). 
 40.  Id. at 776. 
 41.  Id.at 776; ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015). 
 42.  Federal Power Act § 205, 16 U.S.C. § 824(d) (2012). 
 43.  ADAIR & LITZ, supra note 23, at 7. 
 44.  Federal Power Act § 201(b), 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2012).  
 45.  See generally Brief of Electricity Regulation Scholars, supra note 3030 (making and defending 
this argument). 
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should be resolved and unclear (but, this Article contends, deliberately so) about 
the resolution of any specific case. 
A. Applying Conflict Preemption to ZECs 
State subsidy laws and the FPA do not expressly contradict one another, so 
if the former are preempted, it is by applying the doctrine of implied preemption. 
Preemption analysis ordinarily begins with Congress’ purpose in enacting the 
law, and the language and framework of the statutory and regulatory scheme. 
The first form of implied preemption is “field preemption,” under which courts 
hold that Congress has delegated to the federal actor the exclusive right to occupy 
the entire field,46 and conflicting state law must yield. The second form is 
conflict preemption. As the Court stated in ONEOK, “conflict pre-emption” 
requires federal law to prevail over state law where “‘compliance with both state 
and federal law is impossible,’” or where “the state law ‘stands as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.’”47 This type of inquiry is frequently criticized for its 
indeterminacy.48 
Ari Peskoe demonstrates that applying field preemption to the ZEC cases 
would be unwarranted and inconsistent with the reality of concurrent 
jurisdiction.49 Given the interdependence between actors in the electric grid and 
the FPA’s allocation of authority to states, there is no reason to believe that 
Congress intended FERC to be the sole arbiter in these situations.50 And parsing 
the FPA for indications of a clear Congressional purpose to preempt all state 
activity would complicate this further. The statute has not changed much since 
its enactment in 1935, and hardly could have foreseen the advent of the modern 
electricity markets.51 
As for conflict preemption, the Court decisions do not explicitly mention it; 
in ONEOK, for example, the parties did not argue it.52 However, courts should 
consider the principles that the Court enunciates in the three cases to be the 
functional equivalent of conflict preemption analysis and use them as 
 
 46.  As the Court stated in ONEOK, this means that Congress has “‘foreclose[d] any state regulation 
in the area,’ irrespective of whether state law is consistent or inconsistent with ‘federal standards.’” and 
“has forbidden the State to take action in the field that the federal statute pre-empts.” ONEOK, Inc., 135 
S. Ct. at 1595 (citing Arizona v. United States, 567 U. S. 387, 401 (2012)). 
 47.  ONEOK, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1595 (citing California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U. S. 93, 100, 
101 (1989)).   
 48.  Scholars have criticized conflict preemption for reaching inconsistent results in many cases 
because (among other reasons) it relies upon an interpretation of the underlying statutes. See generally 
Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226 (2000). 
 49.  Ari Peskoe, State Clean Energy Policies at Risk: Courts Should Not Preempt Zero Emission 
Credits for Nuclear Plants, 44 ECOLOGY L.Q. CURRENTS (2018). 
 50.  Rossi, supra note 2, at 454 (stating that, “It is time for the Court to recognize that field 
preemption, long celebrated in energy regulation, is an anachronism that should no longer have a role in 
modern preemption analysis under these statutes”). 
 51.  Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, supra note 5, at 4. 
 52.  ONEOK, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1602; Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, supra note 
5Error! Reference source not found., at 6. 
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cornerstones of a preemption inquiry. As a practical matter, the Court seems to 
be moving toward establishing conflict preemption as the norm.53 The Court has 
created a roadmap for resolving conflicts between state and federal electricity 
laws, with much to say about which state activities interfere impermissibly with 
federal authority over wholesale markets. One small caveat is necessary. The 
Court has redefined the jurisdictional line so comprehensively that courts should 
be reluctant to rely on doctrine from the past. In particular, pre-1990 decisions 
that precede the advent of the wholesale markets are questionable sources of 
principles to govern the jurisdictional split in the modern market setting. Simply 
repeating principles from those cases as controlling here has serious potential to 
create unwanted dissonance, as older cases often cannot easily be analogized to 
the current setting without understanding critical underlying factual differences. 
B. Paradigmatic Situations of Preemption Under the Supreme Court’s New  
 Doctrine 
Courts may resolve some tension between state and federal law within the 
contours of the Supreme Court’s guidance in the three decisions. Beginning with 
ONEOK, states may not enact laws that are “aimed directly” or “have their 
target” at the wholesale markets.54 Courts must consider “the target at which the 
state law aims in determining whether [the] law is pre-empted.”55 Under FERC 
v. EPSA, FERC, and not the states, has jurisdiction over “practices” that “directly 
affect” wholesale rates.56 Under Hughes, a state law is preempted as an 
impermissible invasion of FERC’s regulatory turf if it is “adjusting an interstate 
wholesale rate.”57 And, also under Hughes, once FERC has approved a market 
structure as just and reasonable, states may not conclude otherwise.58 For 
example, a state cannot “condition payment [of funds] on capacity clearing the 
[wholesale] auction.”59 State laws that are “untethered to wholesale market 
participation,” however, are not preempted.60 
 
 53.  Two prominent energy law scholars have recently concluded that the new decisions represent 
a movement toward a conflict preemption approach. Emily Hammond, Response, Hughes v. Talen Energy 
Marketing, LLC: Energy Law’s Jurisdictional Boundaries – Take Three, GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
DOCKET (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.gwlr.org/hughes-v-talen-energy-marketing-llc-energy-laws-
jurisdictional-boundaries-take-three/ (noting that, “Arguably, the Court engaged in a conflict analysis as 
a functional matter, notwithstanding its disavowal of such an approach.”); Rossi, supra note 2, at 456. In 
that light, Jim Rossi reconceptualizes two significant pre-1990 cases as conflict preemption decisions, and 
not field preemption as they are commonly understood. Rossi, supra note 2, at 456.   
 54.  ONEOK, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1600. 
 55.  Id.at 1599. 
 56.  FERC v. Elec. Pwr. Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 774 (2016).. For a discussion of the decades-
long origin of this standard, see Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra 
note 4.  
 57.  Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1297 (2016). 
 58.  Id.at 1298–99. 
 59.  Id.at 1299. 
 60.  Id.at 1299. See Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, supra note 5, at 20, for a discussion 
of this language. 
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This imprecise language only begins the inquiry. ONEOK’s “aimed at” and 
“target” language is inartfully phrased, but it reflects the Court’s paramount 
concern that states may not interfere with the wholesale markets. The Court 
distinguished “‘traditional’ state regulation, such as state blue sky laws” from 
laws “aimed at natural-gas companies in particular.”61 Laws that regulate 
businesses generally should be permissible, but laws “aimed” at the wholesale 
markets should not. Applying this test to states’ ZEC programs is 
straightforward. Unlike antitrust law, which is broadly applicable, ZECs only 
impact electricity generators. And the states reference and aim to affect what 
happens on wholesale markets, so their aim is clear. 
Second, a state cannot interfere with FERC’s “practices affecting rates” 
jurisdiction, as defined in FERC v. EPSA. This statutory language gives FERC 
authority over practices that “directly” affect wholesale rates.62 Under this FPA 
provision, as courts interpret it, FERC has authority over much more than the 
rates in wholesale markets. FERC governs the terms and conditions that 
determine how electricity, the capacity to generate it, and related ancillary 
services are exchanged there. The direct impact can be on market parameters and 
not just on the actual monetary amounts exchanged for electricity. FERC has 
authority over matters closely related to wholesale rates, but not over actions 
with trivial impacts on the markets.63 
A direct action need not have an immediate impact on markets, as there can 
be intermediate steps.64 FERC v. EPSA’s discussion of demand response 
provides the quintessential example. As the Electric Power Supply Association 
notes, “[d]emand-response transactions do not even involve the sale of wholesale 
electricity, yet the Court held that FERC had jurisdiction because demand 
response ‘directly affects’ wholesale rates.”65 The D.C. Circuit characterized 
demand response as a retail customer’s decision to cut back demand, which it 
believed was within exclusive state jurisdiction over retail sales. The Court 
disagreed. If a customer agreed with an intermediary to cut demand, and that 
demand reduction was subsequently offered in the wholesale energy market, it 
would affect the price. Indeed, the Court could not “think of a practice that” 
affected wholesale rates “more.”66 FERC v. EPSA made no new law on this 
 
 61.  ONEOK, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1600. 
 62.  Federal Power Act § 206, 16 U.S.C. § 824(e) (2012); see Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority 
to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 4, at 1814.  
 63.  Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 4, at 1830–33 
(discussing Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395, 398 (D.C. Cir. 2004)); Rossi, supra 
note 2, at 460.  
 64.  Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 4, at 1829.  
 65.  Plaintiffs’ Memorandum In Opposition To Motion To Dismiss at 18, FERC v. Elec. Pwr. 
Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016) (No. 17-CV-1164).  
 66.  Elec. Pwr. Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. at 775; see Eisen, FERC v. EPSA, supra note 38.   
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point, as there is a decades-long history of interpreting “directness” in this 
fashion.67 
And “directness” can be present even if an entity over which FERC does 
not have jurisdiction – a state, for example – takes an underlying action. The 
Court’s rejection of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in EPSA is telling on this point. 
A state cannot segment off only those aspects of its actions that fall exclusively 
within its jurisdiction, if a causal chain leads to direct impacts on wholesale 
rates.68 Actions with direct impacts may be precluded if there is a close 
relationship to wholesale rates, even if intermediate steps are uncertain to happen 
or require actions by other entities.69 Besides demand response, other examples 
include the transmission planning requirements and elimination of the federal 
right of first refusal embodied in FERC’s landmark rule, Order 1000. Neither of 
these immediately change wholesale rates, but both were upheld as proper 
exercises of FERC’s jurisdiction.70 FERC recently reiterated this concept of 
directness in an Order explaining its authority over state energy efficiency 
resources bid into the wholesale markets.71 
Finally, Hughes invalidated a Maryland program involving a “contract for 
differences.” Maryland solicited proposals for a new power plant in a specific 
location, because it was unhappy with the wholesale markets’ perceived failure 
to provide incentives for new plants. It guaranteed the winning bidder in an 
auction that utilities and other load-serving entities would make up the difference 
between the contract price and the wholesale capacity market price.72 This was 
a two-way ratchet: “[i]f the natural gas-fired power were compensated by the 
market less than the guaranteed amount, purchasers in-state had to pay the 
difference. By contrast, if the power cleared the market for more than the 
guaranteed amount, the generators would refund that difference to ratepayers.”73 
The Court found that Maryland had interfered with FERC’s authority by tying 
the compensation to an amount above wholesale market prices.74 
As Professor Emily Hammond notes, the Court was not limiting its holding 
to the specific Maryland program, as it found a number of problems with it: 
 
 67.  Rossi, supra note 2, at 459 (calling this principle “well established as a limit on FERC’s 
jurisdiction”); see generally Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra 
note 4. 
 68.  The Court held that FERC could properly make Order 745 within its statutory authority over 
practices affecting rates. Rossi, supra note 2, at 459. The reverse holds as well: if a state takes an action 
that falls within FERC’s direct authority over the markets, it can preempt it. Id. Jim Rossi correctly notes 
that causation is “best understood as a pragmatic requirement for FERC to make factual and policy 
findings, not as a fixed judicial or common law threshold a court can articulate in the abstract.” Id. 
 69.  Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 4, at 1829.  
 70.  S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (upholding provisions of 
Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 
Order 1000, 18 C.F.R. pt 35 (2011)). 
 71.  Order on Petition For Declaratory Order, Advanced Energy Economy, 161 FERC ¶ 61,245 
(2017). 
 72.  Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, supra note 5, at 10. 
 73.  Hammond, supra note 5, at 12.   
 74.  Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1299 (2016).. 
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The reasoning is not altogether clear because the Court noted a variety of 
flaws at various points in the opinion, among them: (1) the statute is preempted 
because “by adjusting an interstate wholesale rate, Maryland’s program invades 
FERC’s regulatory turf,” (2) states may not enact measures “aimed directly” at 
FERC-jurisdictional markets, (3) once FERC has approved a market as just and 
reasonable, states may not conclude otherwise, and/or (4) Maryland could not 
condition payment on capacity clearing the wholesale auction.75 
The Court distinguished the Maryland program from “various other 
measures States might employ to encourage development of new or clean 
generation, including tax incentives, land grants, direct subsidies, construction 
of state-owned facilities, or re-regulation of the energy sector.”76 These are 
“untethered to a generator’s wholesale market participation,” although it is 
unclear what the Court meant by this language. The Court expressly declined to 
rule on preemption of such incentives.77 As discussed more fully below, that may 
be a deliberate signal of an overall judicial inclination: if a state law disregards 
wholesale rates by creating a link or “tether” to the wholesale markets, the 
program will fall. 
II. A TEST FOR ZEC PREEMPTION: CONSCIOUS DISREGARD OF WHOLESALE 
RATES 
Interpreting the Supreme Court’s recent decisions is likely to be a decades-
long project, and there are monumental stakes involved in shaping the electric 
grid’s future, particularly to meet the states’ asserted objective of 
decarbonization.78 Before delving into this Article’s test and its application to 
the ZEC programs, some observations are in order about the current decision-
making landscape. 
A. A Call For Judicial Modesty 
Concurrent electricity federalism has just become a recognized thing, and 
its meaning is already the subject of considerable disagreement. Going forward, 
there is much promise and much risk. Contemporaneous action in the absence of 
 
 75.  Hammond, supra note 5, at 12–13; see Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, supra note 
5, at 10. 
 76.  Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299. 
 77.  Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299; Hammond, supra note 5, at 13. For a discussion of how this leaves 
space for state policy experiments, see Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, supra note 5, at 17–
19. 
 78.  Emily Hammond & Jim Rossi, Stranded Costs and Grid Decarbonization, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 
645, 663–64 (2017) (noting that decarbonization “stands to be one of the most significant economic 
transformations the economy has experienced in the last century”); William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, 
Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking and Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810, 
812 (2016) (“[D]ecarbonizing the electric power sector is far and away the most important component of 
any effort to meet ambitious U.S. [greenhouse gas] reduction targets 
by 2050 and beyond.”). See generally Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1621 
(2015). 
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clear standards can yield synergistic results,79 but it will also inevitably produce 
misunderstandings or discord. Two sovereigns acting independently and 
simultaneously can create friction in many different ways. They could 
misinterpret the Court’s language. Their governance processes, designed with 
insufficient attention to regulating jurisdictional boundaries,80 could lead them 
to conflicting results. They could rely on different goals and reach incompatible 
policy results. They could know the other sovereign’s goals and deliberately 
disregard them. Or the conflict could arise from a combination of any of these 
and more. 
The Court’s flexible guidance skillfully recognizes the multiplicity of 
possibilities: it highlights the interdependent nature of state and federal actors 
and neither sets bright lines nor overlooks consideration of either sovereign’s 
interests. Yet that does not tell us what a reviewing court should do in specific 
situations. To begin with, this exceedingly complex landscape calls for judicial 
modesty. Courts should avoid definitive conclusions about what the Supreme 
Court’s language does or does not mean.81 Star and Zibelman repeatedly assert 
that one or more decisions (particularly Hughes) is clearly and unequivocally 
limited to its specific facts.82 In light of the Court’s imprecision, that can hardly 
be the case. And sweeping pronouncements walling off large classes of activities 
to one actor’s exclusive jurisdiction are incompatible with the Court’s intention 
to resolve conflicts as they arise. 
Yet the lack of an obvious bright line makes the ZEC cases exquisitely 
difficult to decide. It would be unwise to crudely override either actor’s policy 
goals, if that is not necessary. On the other hand, an actor’s reliance on its stated 
goals cannot be the sole touchstone for decision making, particularly when policy 
objectives diverge, as they often will. For that matter, preemption analysis rests 
on a judgment about Congressional intent, and does not allow states to rest solely 
on their policy justifications.83 
 
 79.  Rossi, supra note 2, at 453 (observing that, “[r]ecognition of concurrent jurisdiction would 
allow for federal regulation of energy markets without automatically preempting state experimentation 
and, especially, state approaches that advance the same goals federal regulators have endorsed”). 
 80.  Welton, supra note 1818, at 41 (discussing the inadequacy of RTO governance systems in this 
regard and noting that, “There is, in sum, a byzantine set of dynamics facing RTO efforts to integrate state 
decarbonization aims.”).  
 81.  Hammond, supra note 5, at 15; Welton, supra note 18, at 7 (noting that, “Hughes left open 
significant questions regarding how much overlap there can be between regional market functions and 
state policy aims”). 
 82.  As an example, Zibelman stated the following: “Hughes clearly stated that the impermissible 
tether was ‘to a generator’s wholesale market participation,’ id. at 1299 (emphasis added), and nowhere 
stated, implied or even considered that a State program’s incorporation of the wholesale market price 
would provide a basis for preemption.” Coal. For Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d 554, 
569 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed, No. 17-2654 (2d Cir. Aug. 25, 2017). In a subsequent footnote, the court 
stated, ”The Court finds no basis to conclude that consideration of wholesale prices (whether forecast or 
actual) in pricing a subsidy is material to the preemption analysis.” Id. n.15. 
 83.  While there is considerable discussion about the nature of preemption and how it operates, the 
nature of the inquiry is grounded in the meaning of the statutory text. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, “The 
Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 7 SUP. CT. REV. 
253, 270–71 (2012).  
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B. A Proposed Decision Rule: Allow the Sovereigns To Proceed 
Independently As Long As Neither Targets the Other 
A useful decision rule would allow the states and FERC to proceed 
independently as long as neither attempts to consciously disregard the other. This 
rule addresses the most troubling situations in a system of concurrent 
jurisdiction: when one actor values independence to the exclusion of 
interdependence. The states and FERC will be intertwined for years to come in 
decision making about clean energy policies. Encouraging one to force the other 
to change, or to claim the impact is minimal because that actor can do whatever 
is necessary to adjust to the other’s program,84 is a recipe for constant litigation.  
Preserving the ability to adjust to changed circumstances is especially critical in 
working toward a clean energy future, because we must expect an iterative 
process of policy development, with continuing dialogues as necessary. 
It is especially unwise to allow one actor to insist upon correcting what it 
sees as flaws of the other’s approach, as it ignores any opportunity to make 
adjustments without coercion. Allowing states to operate unilaterally in spite of 
the markets, for example, overlooks potential fixes.85 Some RTOs are currently 
addressing the markets’ failure to internalize environmental externalities, the 
precise issue that ZEC proponents target.86 And a growing number of 
commentators believe that FERC can approve market rule revisions to price 
carbon.87 
The focus on conscious disregard has many advantages. Given the 
extraordinary variety of states’ clean energy policies, it is nearly impossible to 
define any other boundary between permissible and impermissible actions. 
Indeed, several commentators have stated that working with the Court’s 
 
 84.  Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 16–17, Village of Old Mill Creek, et al. v. Star, No. 17-2445 
(2017) (demonstrating that this proposition is contradicted in the case of ZECs by FERC’s statement in 
its notice of the technical conference on state and federal policies that the ability to harmonize them is an 
“open question”). See Farmer, supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing the technical conference). 
 85.  For an interesting proposal in this regard, see generally Hannah J. Wiseman, Disaggregating 
Preemption In Energy Law, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293 (2016) (criticizing the all or nothing approach 
of current preemption and recommending disaggregation of energy decisions into subunits for preemption 
analysis).   
 86.  The ISO-New England, New York ISO, California ISO, and PJM RTOs are at various steps of 
considering the integration of state policies generally, and carbon pricing in particular. JUSTIN GUNDLACH 
AND ROMANY WEBB, CARBON PRICING IN NEW YORK ISO MARKETS: FEDERAL AND STATE ISSUES iii 
n.1 (2017); Hammond, supra note 5, at 7–8 (detailing the efforts in PJM and ISO-New England); Power 
Shift, Webinar on Carbon Pricing in RTO Markets (Oct, 31, 2016), 
http://environment.law.harvard.edu/webinar-carbon-pricing-rto-markets/; but see generally Welton, 
supra note 18 (arguing against proceeding in this fashion).  
 87.  See, e.g., Ari Peskoe, Easing Jurisdictional Tensions by Integrating Public Policy in Wholesale 
Electricity Markets, 38 ENERGY L.J. 1, 11–12 (2017); Christopher J. Bateman & James T.B. Tripp, 
Toward Greener FERC Regulation of the Power Industry, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 276 (2014); Eisen, 
FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 44, at 1829; Steve Weissman & 
Romany Webb, Addressing Climate Change Without Legislation: How the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission Can Use Its Existing Legal Authority to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Increase 
Clean Energy Use, 2 BERKELEY ENERGY & CLIMATE INITIATIVE 2–5 (2013). 
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language may become a “never-ending exercise.”88 By contrast, the rule 
articulated here would limit preemption to the most obvious situations on which 
the Court focused its attention. It eschews setting a new jurisdictional bright line, 
and preserves the traditional authorities of each sovereign to engage in 
experimentation with clean energy policies as long as it does not target the other. 
Another advantage is relative ease of administrability. The factual 
determinations required to establish disregard will be found in declarations of the 
state’s intent. A reviewing court would need to look beyond proffered 
justifications for a program and examine legislative history or the record of an 
administrative proceeding,89 but courts are often better equipped to do this than 
to parse through complex nuances of market interactions. Evidence of 
impermissible targeting, as discussed more fully below, may be found in a 
reference to wholesale market prices in the support formula.90 It may also be 
found in a state legislative or administrative record that justifies the support on 
the basis of making up a revenue shortfall. This analysis is likely to lead to fewer 
judicial errors, although it still would involve line-drawing challenges in close 
cases. 
The Court’s decisions lead almost inexorably to delineating preemption in 
this fashion. Consider how the Court dwells on protecting the wholesale markets 
from interference. ONEOK distinguished between a “challenge [to] the 
reasonableness of . . . rates expressly approved by FERC” and a state law that 
regulates “background marketplace conditions that affected both jurisdictional 
and nonjurisdictional rates.”91 If the state “challenges” the work that FERC and 
the RTOs have done, it finds it unsound – or, in other words, disregards it. 
Similarly, Hughes precluded more than adding a sweetener on top of the 
wholesale rate or conditioning a credit on clearing a market.92 It spoke to 
“adjusting” wholesale rates – no state can tinker with, tweak, alter, or disregard 
them. This comports with ONEOK, FERC v. EPSA, and previous decisions 
holding that states may not independently “substitut[e] their own determinations 
of what would be just and fair” wholesale rates.93 No one state policy can be said 
to do that exclusively, although allowing states to substitute administrative 
processes for markets to establish plants’ revenue is the epitome of this. 
Hughes’s final paragraphs about state subsidies “untethered” to the markets 
are a useful proxy for distinguishing permissible actions from impermissible 
ones. Property tax subsidies are not designed to consciously disregard the 
wholesale markets, because they do not target or reference them. Some broad-
 
 88.  Hammond, supra note 5, at 15. 
 89.  Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, supra note 5, at 17–20 (illustrating a hypothetical 
inquiry into a state tax exemption, and the inquiry into ZECs).   
 90.  Id. at 21.   
 91.  ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1602 (2015). 
 92.  Supra note75 75 and accompanying text. 
 93.  Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 371 (1988); Plaintiffs’ Memorandum 
In Opposition To Motion To Dismiss, supra note 65, at 20 (quoting this language). 
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based subsidies might have substantial impacts on wholesale markets,94 but 
financial impact alone is not the touchstone for analysis. The Zibelman court got 
this completely wrong,95 and also erred by reading the word “participation” in 
Hughes’ “untethered to wholesale market participation” language literally. 
Under its logic, state laws that explicitly require that subsidy recipients 
participate in wholesale markets are the only ones preempted.96 This is not at all 
consistent with Hughes, or with FERC v. EPSA’s directness test. 
Taking all of this together, none of it empowers a state to attempt to correct 
perceived flaws of the wholesale markets. On the contrary, courts disfavor state 
programs that aim to interfere with the structure and operation of the markets, 
notwithstanding any laudable purposes. Courts have consistently held that FERC 
and the RTOs have the sole authority to decide whether the wholesale markets 
must change to achieve competitive outcomes.97 And courts should decline to 
uphold ZECs simply because states wish to value attributes not recognized in the 
wholesale markets. This would elevate conscious disregard to a governing 
principle and encourage other states to pursue around-market policies. Taken to 
its limits, this could completely undermine the markets. As the PJM RTO Market 
Monitor pithily put it, “subsidies are contagious.”98 
C. Under the Proposed Test, ZECs Are Preempted 
This section builds on the previous two, outlining a test that calls for 
preemption of a state’s electricity law when a state acts in disregard of the 
wholesale markets. If a state law explicitly aims to directly change wholesale 
market prices, terms or conditions, its subsidy program should be impermissible 
as an intrusion on FERC’s regulatory turf. If it does not, its program should pass 
muster, even if it might impact the markets. This test brings together three 
distinct concepts. First, a state cannot “aim” its subsidy law at the wholesale 
markets, as in ONEOK. Second, FERC, not the states, has authority over the 
terms, conditions, and results on wholesale markets, under FERC v. EPSA’s 
directness standard. And finally, targeting wholesale rates is what the Supreme 
Court found problematic in Hughes, among other defects of the Maryland 
 
 94.  Coal. For Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d 554, 572 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal 
docketed, No. 17-2654 (2d Cir. Aug. 25, 2017) (noting that, “Plaintiffs even concede that such measures 
‘would have some of the same effects’ on the market.”); Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, supra 
note 5, at 18 (discussing the potential for a hypothetical tax subsidy to have a substantial or even equivalent 
effect on wholesale prices). 
 95.  Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d at 568 (misinterpreting the Hughes standard by focusing on the 
magnitude of the subsidies). 
 96.  Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d at 568. 
 97.  An example of this is the line of cases upholding designs – and redesigns – of regional capacity 
markets. See, e.g., Advanced Energy Mgmt. All. v. FERC, No. 16-1234 (D.C. Cir. June 20, 2017); Eisen, 
FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 4, at 1825–27 (discussing FERC’s 
authority over capacity markets). Cf. Rossi, supra note 2, at 454 (noting that the transmission planning 
decisions “are pragmatic choices about the best institutional balance for regulating modern energy 
markets—decisions that Congress has delegated to FERC in recognition of its expertise”).  
 98.  MONITORING ANALYTICS, LLC, STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT FOR PJM v. 2, at 2 (2016). 
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program. Applying this test to state ZEC programs, this Article finds ZECs 
violate all three principles and should be preempted. 
Under ONEOK’s “aim” test, the states’ inquiry into the reasonableness of 
wholesale rates is impermissible.99 A formula that changes credit prices in line 
with wholesale market prices aims at those rates. It is immaterial that the 
targeting is not exactly the same as in the Maryland program, where the state 
contract made up the entire revenue shortfall. The key concept is attempting to 
target the result that prevails in the wholesale markets, which “regulate[s] in 
areas where FERC has properly exercised its jurisdiction to determine just and 
reasonable wholesale rates.”100 
ZECs have a direct impact on wholesale prices.101 For the nuclear plants to 
receive them, they “must operate and sell their output in the market and displace 
the output and the emissions associated with the output of other units.”102 The 
Illinois price adjustment formula “ensur[es] that the ZEC price decreases if 
wholesale market prices increase and increases (up to a cap) if wholesale market 
prices decrease.”103 That is a direct effect on the markets, even if it does not 
effectuate a dollar for dollar change in wholesale prices. Nothing in FERC v. 
EPSA requires that. New York and its supporters argue that it is only forecasting 
future wholesale rates,104 which would limit interference with FERC’s authority 
to situations where today’s wholesale rates were actually changed. FERC v. 
EPSA does not hold this, either. 
Star and Zibelman assert the flawed premise that a state program can 
directly affect wholesale markets only if it immediately changes market prices. 
Star states that, “the ‘tether’ in this case is not to wholesale participation or 
transactional pricing; the tether is to broader, indirect wholesale market 
forces.”105 Zibelman distinguishes “state actions that affect the wholesale price 
in some way” from “state actions that set the wholesale rate,” with the former 
being permissible.106 To both courts, any action at least one step removed from 
 
 99.  ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1602 (2015) (citing Miss. Power & Light, 487 
U.S. at 374). 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 57, Electric Power Supply Association, et al. v. Star, No. 17-
2445  (7th Cir. Aug. 28, 2017) (noting that under the Illinois ZEC program, “Because the favored plants 
are guaranteed a rate of $47.90 per MWh across a wide range of market-clearing prices, Clinton and Quad 
Cities will bid all of their output into the MISO and PJM energy auctions for the next decade.”). 
 102.  Brief of Independent Market Monitor for PJM, supra note 18, at 2.   
 103.  Plaintiffs’ Memorandum In Opposition To Motion To Dismiss, supra note 64, at 17; Brief of 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 101, at 7 (“As auction prices decrease, the ZEC subsidy increases, and 
vice versa, thereby guaranteeing that the plants will be paid for wholesale electricity sales at the rate 
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from the PJM and MISO auctions.”). 
 104.  See, e.g., Brief of the Institute For Policy Integrity as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendants-
Appellees at 23, Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, No. 17-2654-cv (2nd Cir. Nov. 27, 2017). 
 105.  Village of Old Mill Creek v. Star, 2017 WL 3008289, at *13 (N.D. Ill.), appeal docketed, No. 
17-2445 (7th Cir. July 18, 2017). 
 106.  Coal. For Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d 554, 571–72 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal 
docketed, No. 17-2654 (2d Cir. Aug. 25, 2017) 
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actually adding an amount to wholesale prices is not direct.107 FERC v. EPSA 
rejected this argument; as the PJM Market Monitor’s brief in the Star appeal 
notes, “[t]he concept of ‘indirect wholesale market forces’ is not defined. There 
is no such thing in this case.”108 
Similarly, proponents claim that ZECs are traded in a separate transaction 
and are therefore independent of the markets and beyond FERC’s reach.109 This 
is not correct. FERC’s “directness” authority extends beyond market 
transactions, and ZECs impact prices through a causal chain no less direct than 
a demand response bid through an intermediary. A state is not allowed to saw off 
one link in the causal chain, claim its law has only that effect, and then argue its 
action is permissible. And, as also noted above, the directness is most apparent 
when the state’s purpose is precisely to change what transpires on the markets. 
As in Hughes, the state pricing formulas expressly tether ZECs to the 
wholesale markets. One recent analysis puts it succinctly, stating that, “it is hard 
to see how [ZECs] can survive Hughes. Essentially, these states have tethered 
compensation for merchant plants to the wholesale markets, and have done so 
for the purpose of making up for flaws in those markets.”110 The states argue that 
ZECs are not tethered to the markets because no plant that receives the credits is 
forced to bid into wholesale markets. It would be a stretch to limit Hughes to 
situations of this sort. It also ignores reality to say that bidding is a “business 
decision,” as the Zibelman court put it.111 The states’ aim to make up for revenue 
shortfalls contradicts this. These plants offer some or all of their electricity in the 
markets— they would have no revenues and would fail if they did not bid their 
electricity there. The states cannot simultaneously attempt to make up for the 
plants’ revenue shortfall, and pretend that the shortfall does not exist because the 
plants are not obligated to bid. The states’ own mathematical formulas that show 
they are expressly contemplating that plants will bid in the markets also undercut 
their argument. They take wholesale prices into account, and there would be no 
reason to do so if that was irrelevant to the plants’ owners. 
The Star court’s observation that the wholesale markets can – and must – 
adjust to the impacts on markets resulting from the states’ credit programs 
completely inverts the relevant analysis under FERC v. EPSA. If a state program 
thwarts the purposes and objectives of the wholesale market design, it is not 
relevant that the grid operators could adjust their market structures to yield 
satisfactory results. Once FERC has approved a market structure as just and 
reasonable, it is not for the states to conclude otherwise.112 It is the point of being 
forced to revise the structure, due to a state program that has this as its aim, that 
is relevant. 
 
 107.  Village of Old Mill Creek, 2017 WL 3008289, at *13; Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d at 571–72. 
 108.  Brief of Independent Market Monitor for PJM, supra note 18, at 5–6.  
 109.  See, e.g., Brief of the Institute For Policy Integrity, supra note 104, at 22 (calling it a “wholly 
separate” payment). 
 110.  Hammond, supra note 5, at 15. 
 111.  Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d at 570. 
 112.  Miss. Power & Light Co., 487 U.S. 354 (1988). 
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Finally, Zibelman cites the Second Circuit’s 1985 Rochester Gas 
decision113 in contrast to Hughes, but that decision does not refute Hughes and 
is actually consistent with this Article’s test. In that case, the utility wished to set 
retail rates while acknowledging the revenues that it would receive from certain 
“incidental sales” (bilateral wholesale transactions).114 There was no suggestion 
that the utility aimed to change any terms or conditions of those sales.115 The 
utility was not attempting to “adjust” a wholesale rate, but was merely 
acknowledging the end product of the wholesale rate making process. It was not 
creating a feedback mechanism, as the incidental sales would not be affected in 
any way by retail rate setting.116 This, the court properly stated, was permissible. 
This result is consistent with the test expressed in this Article, as the state action 
involved no disregard. It also squares with Supreme Court’s “trapping” cases 
such as Mississippi Power and Light117 that were decided contemporaneously to 
Rochester Gas. In these cases, the Court held that utilities could not disregard 
wholesale rates, but instead were required to pass them through as inputs to the 
retail level. 
III.  PREEMPTING ZECS WHILE PRESERVING THE STATES’ ABILITY TO 
PROMOTE CLEAN ENERGY 
Ari Peskoe (in his companion article), law professor amici, and some 
environmental groups and clean energy advocates, whom one might not 
normally expect to support subsidies to aging nuclear power plants, have lined 
up in favor of the ZECs. Their primary concern is that preserving ZECs is 
essential for the survival of other state green energy programs.118 Accordingly, 
they argue that states have exclusive authority over design and implementation 
of clean energy credit programs.119 This misses the mark. 
 
 113.  Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d at 569 (citing Rochester Gas and Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n of New York, 754 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1985)). 
 114.  Rochester Gas and Electric Corp., 754 F.2d at 102. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Plaintiffs’ Memorandum In Opposition To Motion To Dismiss, supra note 65, at 18 (noting 
that, “Central to the Second Circuit’s holding was its finding that the policy of the New York Public 
Service Commission (‘PSC’) to consider federally-regulated wholesale sales when it set state-
jurisdictional retail rates would not affect the wholesale-market decisions of the utility at issue.”); 
Rochester Gas and Electric Corp., 754 F.2d at 102 (“[W]e do not believe that PSC’s [policies] materially 
affect [the utility’s] incidental sales decisions.”). 
 117.  Miss. Power & Light Co., 487 U.S. 354 (1988). 
 118.  Briefs filed by environmental groups in the Seventh Circuit in support of the District Court’s 
position include Amici Curiae Brief of Natural Resources Defense Council, Environmental Defense Fund, 
Citizens Utility Board, Elevate Energy and Respiratory Health Association in Support of Defendants‐
Appellees and Affirmance, Nos. 17‐ 2433, 17‐ 2445 (cons.); and Brief of Electricity Regulation Scholars, 
supra note 30. In the Zibelman appeal, these parties were joined by the NYU Law Institute For Policy 
Integrity. See Brief of the Institute For Policy Integrity, supra note 104.  
See also Welton, supra note 18, at 30 (noting that “the ZEC program divided the environmental 
community, with many groups coming out in support of it.”).  
 119.  Brief of Electricity Regulation Scholars, supra note 45.   
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A. State Clean Energy Programs; Distinguishing ZECs 
States have numerous and diverse efforts underway to promote sources of 
clean and renewable power.120 They have had exclusive authority to design 
programs to subsidize clean energy by mechanisms such as renewable portfolio 
standards (RPS) and renewable energy certificate (REC) programs tied to 
them.121 A RPS “requires electric utility companies to source a certain share of 
the electricity they sell to end-users from renewable sources of energy.”122 
Utilities prove their compliance with these requirements through RECs.123 A 
REC is a tradeable, market-based instrument that represents a megawatt-hour of 
electricity generated and delivered to the electric grid from a renewable energy 
resource.124 
ZECs and RECs are both credit programs that support carbon-free 
generation. The similarity ends there, as there is a critical distinction between 
them. ZECs aim directly at remedying the revenue shortfall on the wholesale 
markets. RECs do not, because they are designed with reference to 
environmental attributes, not wholesale market prices.125 RPSs promote new 
sources of carbon-free generation, and “generally do not condition eligibility for 
the standards (or the accompanying renewable energy credits) on participation 
in the wholesale markets, nor were they motivated by correcting perceived 
wholesale market failures.”126 RECs are neither traded on the wholesale markets 
nor valued there.127 As the Second Circuit recently noted in its Allco decision 
that upheld Connecticut’s RPS, “RECs are inventions of state property law 
whereby the renewable energy attributes are ‘unbundled’ from the energy itself 
 
 120.  Welton, supra note 1818, at 4 (describing the “rich set of state climate policies”). The wide 
variety of policies is collected at DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES AND EFFICIENCY, 
http://dsireusa.org. 
 121.  Twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia now have RPSs. Mormann, supra note 2, at 
190; DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES AND EFFICIENCY, SUMMARY MAP: RPS 
POLICIES, http://dsireusa.org.   
 122.  Mormann, supra note 2, at 198; cf. Joel B. Eisen, Residential Renewable Energy: By Whom?, 
31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 339, 345 (2011).  
 123.  Mormann, supra note 2, at 198. 
 124.  Id.  
 125.  Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 101, at 52; Plaintiffs’ Memorandum In Opposition 
To Motion To Dismiss, supra note 64, at 21 (noting that, “RECs are not dependent upon or priced with 
respect to the wholesale price of electricity”). This also distinguishes the Second Circuit’s recent decision 
upholding Connecticut’s RPS, which, unlike ZECs, operates completely independently of the wholesale 
markets. Allco Finance Ltd. v. Klee, 861 F.3d 82, 108 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 926 (2018). 
 126.  Hammond, supra note 5, at 13.  
 127.  The Zibelman court correctly notes this. Coal. For Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 
3d 554, 571–72 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed, No. 17-2654 (2d Cir. Aug. 25, 2017). It then concludes that 
because this is a separate transaction it cannot be said to set the wholesale rate. That does not square with 
FERC v. EPSA. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
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and sold separately.”128 The value of RECs depends on supply and demand for 
them, and is completely unrelated to wholesale market prices.129 
 
RPS programs subsidize renewable power generators.130 That by itself does not 
make them impermissible. Like a property tax subsidy, a direct subsidy, or the 
other means of supporting generation that Hughes found permissible, their value 
is not linked to the wholesale markets. A REC recipient could impact the 
wholesale markets by taking REC revenue into account in its bid, but the lack of 
conscious aim at the markets makes this permissible. Indeed, a number of state 
RPSs predate the wholesale markets, so they could not have been designed with 
reference to them. 
B. Retaining Authority For Other State Clean Energy Programs 
The distinction articulated in the previous section may seem like splitting 
hairs, but under a test for preemption that rests on conscious disregard for the 
wholesale markets, it makes all the difference. In designing an RPS, the state 
proceeds with no eye on the markets. It can and should be able to do this. Thus, 
courts could invalidate the ZECs while avoiding interference with state 
experiments to promote clean and renewable energy. Under this test, states would 
retain considerable latitude to design environmental credit programs. Arguments 
that ZECs are essential for states to address climate change confuse the ultimate 
issue, because New York and Illinois could easily redesign their ZEC programs 
to pass muster. If they valued the emissions exclusively at the social cost of 
carbon, that would be permissible under this Article’s test.131 
Finally, the environmentalists supporting ZECs should prefer the conscious 
disregard standard to an argument resting on states’ authority over credit 
programs. Parochial programs subsidizing individual plants may not always have 
environmentally friendly results. One state could tout carbon-free generation, but 
another may well decide to protect coal fired power plants because the state 
believes they can operate in emergency conditions and that wholesale markets 
do not value “resilience” of this sort. In fact, in the last year, two states have 
introduced legislation to support coal-fired power plants in their state by valuing 
 
 128.  Allco Finance Ltd. v. Klee, 861 F.3d at 93 (citing Wheelabrator Lisbon, Inc. v. Conn. Dep’t of 
Pub. Util. Control, 531 F.3d 183, 186 15 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam)). As such, different states define 
RECs differently, focusing on various attributes which they deem to be especially relevant. Id. 
 129.  Plaintiffs’ Memorandum In Opposition To Motion To Dismiss, supra note 65, at 22 (noting 
that, “the REC price is typically determined by a competitive market for renewable energy credits, not by 
a state dictate based on how much the favored plant will receive from wholesale electric market sales.”).  
 130.  Hammond & Spence, supra note 4, at 206 (noting that, “RPSs increase the price electricity 
retailers are willing to pay for clean power”). The precise extent of this subsidy is unknown. Brief of 
Electricity Regulation Scholars, supra note 45, at 219 (noting that, “teasing out the precise effect that state 
policy and FERC-regulated wholesale rates have on REC prices involves complex calculations, and we 
are not aware of any definitive conclusions. Suffice it to say, REC prices and wholesale power prices are 
interrelated to varying degrees in different markets.”).   
 131.  Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, supra note 5, at 21. 
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their purported resilience attributes.132 And the Department of Energy directed 
FERC to consider the value of resiliency to the grid, to which FERC responded 
by opening a broader proceeding on the matter.133 If states have broad authority 
to craft credit programs, a “resilience” credit would be permissible. Under a 
standard that focuses on disregard for the markets, a “resilience” standard might 
fall, depending on its design. 
CONCLUSION 
The test outlined in this Article requires states to be forthright about their 
incentives to promote clean energy. If nuclear power plants are unprofitable due 
to low wholesale market clearing prices, a state may support them with initiatives 
that fall within its traditional authorities. This Article concludes, however, that 
the state may not explicitly target its program to compensate for what it believes 
are dissatisfactory wholesale market outcomes. States that joined the wholesale 
markets need to adhere to their results. As Shelley Welton notes, no one forced 
states to participate: they “decided to join regional electricity markets in order to 
have these markets competitively select least-cost electricity and generating 
capacity.”134 And if a state can set the terms of the debate by attempting to make 
up for market shortcomings, the overall design of the markets is threatened. 
There is no “preoccupation with market sanctity” here, either.135 A test that 
focuses on conscious disregard is a narrow one that would address some around-
market situations, but would leave considerable room for state policy 
experimentation. And, as states consider how to promote clean energy, the 
wholesale markets, which were designed to provide least-cost electricity, will 
have to change to accommodate these policies. That would continue to leave 
much uncertainty about the boundary between the two, but that is a desirable 
 
 132.  Two bills (HB 239 and SB 155) were introduced in the Ohio legislature in 2017 to provide 
“perpetual subsidies for two coal-fired plants.” Maloney, Feud of the Year, supra note 3; Kathiann M. 
Kowalski, As Ohio legislature regroups, power plant subsidy debate to continue, ENERGY NEWS 
NETWORK (Aug. 16, 2017), https://energynews.us/midwest/as-ohio-legislature-regroups-power-plant-
subsidy-debate-continues/. Illinois also moved forward with legislation to support coal-fired power plants 
in the state, but it failed in the 2017 legislative session. Amanda Durish Cook, Dynegy Auction Proposal 
Fails to Gain Ill. Lawmaker Support, RTO INSIDER (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.rtoinsider.com/dynegy-
capacity-market-80654/.  
 133.  Using its rarely-invoked authority under Section 403 of the Department of Energy Organization 
Act (42 U.S.C. § 7173(a) (2012)), the Department of Energy directed FERC to begin a rulemaking to 
recognize the “resiliency” of coal and nuclear power plants and provide them with cost-of-service 
recovery. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 60134 (proposed 
Oct. 10, 2017) (to be codified at 18 CRF pt. 35), 
https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/09/f37/Notice%20of%20Proposed%20Rulemaking%20.pdf; see 
also Gavin Bade, Chatterjee: coal plants should be ‘properly compensated’ for grid value, 
UTILITYDIVE.COM (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/chatterjee-coal-plants-should-be-
properly-compensated-for-grid-value/449367/. A FERC order in January 2018 rejected the rulemaking 
proposal but began a new proceeding to investigate the nature of resilience and make appropriate changes 
to wholesale markets. Order Terminating Rulemaking Proceeding, Instituting New Proceeding, And 
Establishing Additional Procedures, 162 FERC ¶ 61,012  (Jan. 8, 2018). 
 134.  Welton, supra note 18, at 20. 
 135.  Hammond, supra note 5, at 15. 
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outcome. That hardly spells the end of the markets,136 and for now seems 
preferable to sweeping rules that establish new bright lines of their own. 
 
 
 136.  Id. 
